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ABSTRACT 
Studies on experimentation for climate governance are steadily growing in number as governments and 
communities seek to address the wicked problem of climate change. However, most studies focus on 
mitigation efforts, with far less attention spent on how society is addressing increasing adaptation needs. 
Moreover, despite experiments being the integral part of adaptive management’s learning-by-doing 
approach little is understood of what learning is produced by experiments and how it is generated. The 
understanding of the relationship between the two concepts is overly simplistic and only a few empirical 
studies have been undertaken to explain their dynamics (e.g. Armitage et al. 2008; Farrelly & Brown 2011; 
van der Heijden 2014). Therefore, this paper seeks to explain how learning is produced by experimentation 
with a focus on external learning- that within the surrounding policy network; using proxy indicators for 
learning: how credible, salient, and legitimate political decision makers perceive the evidence to be.  
It uses data from 17 policy-relevant experiments that produced or are still producing evidence for their 
surrounding policy network. The experiments are grouped in a three-way typology of ideal types drawn 
from the science-policy interface literature: the technocratic, boundary, and advocacy ideal types. Based on 
the literature, three hypotheses were constructed regarding how the types produce different levels of policy 
learning: technocratic experiments will produce the most credible evidence, the least salient, and 
moderately legitimate; advocacy experiments will produce the most salient evidence but the least credible 
and legitimate; and boundary experiments will produce legitimate evidence that is also perceived to be 
moderately salient but not very credible. In order to test the hypotheses, the surrounding policy network of 
each case was surveyed for their perceptions on the experiment’s evidence. From a total response count of 
164, 70 full responses were given for 14 experiments from three institutional levels. The results show that 
on the whole the evidence from experiments is perceived favourably, with positive average scores for all 
three types. However, the hypotheses were partially met, as surprisingly technocratic experiments were 
perceived to be the least credible, salient, and legitimate. This raises questions about some of the apparent 
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trade-offs that must be made when designing science-policy interfaces, as the data indicates that one 
particular institutional design can almost meet all three learning attributes.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Policy experiments are a phenomenon that is receiving increasing attention as policy makers seek 
innovative ways to solve complex policy issues. Policy making is a dynamic craft; it governs society 
within an increasingly complex social-ecological system and ideally, policy decisions will be better 
decisions if they are based on scientific evidence (Pawson 2006; Sanderson 2009). Brimming with 
characteristics such as complexity, variability, non-reducibility, and a collective quality (Dryzek 1987), 
social-ecological systems require governance different to that pushing for narrowly focused optimization 
(Walker 2012). One suggested method to increase adaptive capacity in governance arrangements is 
adaptive management, which emphasizes the inherent uncertainty and complexity in social ecological 
systems and advocates for a learning-by-doing approach (Walters & Holling 1990; Lee 1999; Armitage et 
al. 2008; Huitema et al. 2009). Here, innovative management practices are cast as experiments and tested 
for their effects through monitoring and evaluation programmes, as a sort of ex ante evaluation process. 
Based on the results, subsequent adjustments to the approach are made. Support for an experimental 
approach to governance also stems from Campbell’s ‘Experimenting Society’ (1998). The underlying 
premise of the experimenting society is that we are essentially ignorant of how to solve the world’s 
problems and need to create and critique policy-relevant knowledge through policy experimentation, which 
would lead to new forms of public action (Dunn 1998).  
Despite their strong conviction that experimentation and learning will enable better political decisions, 
neither adaptive management nor the experimenting society address the political repercussions of 
experimentation and seem to take for granted that learning will result. For example, one factor of adaptive 
management is that it expects the results of its experiments to be automatically used in iterations of future 
policy; with no consideration for the fact evidence is but one consideration for elites making policy 
decisions (Vedung 1998; Sanderson 2009). Likewise in the experimenting society, despite evaluation 
being central to experimentation, it is often found to be politically difficult or impossible to undertake 
(Peters 1998:133). Evaluation of experiment effects on policy is also empirically lacking. Greenberg et al 
(2003) conducted a thorough analysis on the political impacts of five experiments, and Milo and Lezaun 
(2006) assessed two experiments in regulation for their political impacts, but no studies have explicitly 
captured the extent of learning emanating from experiments and rarely is policy learning examined from an 
evaluation perspective (exceptions are Sanderson 2002; Teirlinck et al. 2013). 
In conclusion, it is the purpose of this paper to pour some empirical analysis into the academic absence that 
is the relationship between experiments and learning in the policy network, which we attempt to do by 
addressing the following research questions:  
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1. What is the significance of a policy experiment to a policy network? How innovative and 
important to policy are experiments really? 
2. To what extent does a policy network learn from evidence produced by a policy 
experiment and what kinds of learning do we observe? 
3. What explains the difference in learning results among multiple experiments?  
To address these questions, the paper is set out as follows: first, we outline how we understand the concept 
of experimentation and how we plan to measure policy learning. Next, we present an analytical framework 
that we use to explain the variation in learning effects found in a group of policy experiments. The 
framework is built around theoretical premises in the policy sciences literature and focuses on the use of 
science in policy making. It understands experiments as temporary science-policy interfaces that have three 
‘ideal type’ institutional arrangements: the technocratic, boundary, and advocacy type. Based on factors 
found in the literature, we hypothesise that these ideal types produce different learning effects and we 
explain how we measure learning by assessing how credible, salient, and legitimate an experiment’s 
evidence is perceived to be by decision makers in an experiment’s surrounding policy network. This 
section is followed by an explanation of data collection and survey methods used. The survey data is 
analysed to assess the extent of this relationship. Finally, we discuss the main findings of and limitations to 
this research. 
 
THEORY 
Use of experimentation in policy making: Reforms on trial 
Policy experimentation has an extensive political and academic history, with analyses conducted since the 
1960s when the idea of the Big Society took shape. DT Campbell was one of the first to kick against what 
he saw as policy decisions being taken without the risk of criticism or failure and he advocated the use of 
policy evaluation using experimental and quasi-experimental approaches (Dunn 1998; Sanderson 2009). 
The method gained traction and during the following decades experimental interventions were conducted 
in an attempt to improve economic, health, and education policy, particularly in the US and UK. Criticisms 
of the use of experiments included ethical issues of treating citizens as subjects, their use to delay action 
and political commitment, and the belief that the complexities of the social world could never be 
understood and managed through such a limiting prism (Fischer 1995; Sanderson 2002; Greenberg et al. 
2003). The concept subsequently lost support, but enjoyed a revival with the emergence of the adaptive 
management approach in environmental governance (Walters & Holling 1990; Lee 1999). Here, 
experimentation is expected to provide reliable evidence of whether new management interventions 
worked, as well as provide a vehicle for incorporating a broad range of actors and new ideas into the policy 
process through the implementation of shadow networks (Meijerink & Huitema 2007). Now, the concept 
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also has a place in the policy innovations literature, where they maintain an evaluative function as well as 
being epicentres of new, innovative forms of governance (Jordan & Huitema 2014). 
These different uses of experimentation highlight varying understandings of the concept, but have in 
common the positive characteristic of being flexible- in that experiments are never implemented on a full 
scale and are reversible (Tassey 2014). A useful definition that captures the important characteristics of 
policy experimentation is: a temporary, controlled field-trial of a policy-relevant innovation that produces 
evidence for subsequent policy decisions. This definition is considerably narrower than that of a related 
concept, the pilot project, which also has an early evaluative function but with multiple purposes: to begin 
roll-out of a new policy (pioneer), demonstrate successful implementation of a policy (demonstrator), 
operationalise a policy to overcome barriers (trailblazer), as well as experiment with new approaches that 
have uncertain effects (policy trial/experiment) (Ettelt et al. 2014). The experiment definition also differs 
from the governance innovations literature in that it emphasises the testing component (compared to 
Hoffman 2011 where experimentation is recognised for its novelty function outside established policy 
order). 
In essence, we consider experimentation as the appraisal of a policy relevant innovation in practice: 
without appraisal you are demonstrating a new initiative, without innovation you are evaluating established 
ideas. These descriptors go some way to explain why as a method of developing new policy approaches, 
experimentation is actually quite uncommon (Peters 1998; Gunderson 1999; Sanderson 2009). Even if 
governments do occasionally attempt institutional reform, the evaluation of outcomes is lacking (Campbell 
1998). Moreover, innovation itself may be seen as limited, with policy change mostly occurring 
incrementally within existing programmes and not in the bursts that you would expect if radical innovation 
was common (Vedung 1998:193).  
Policy learning 
Learning is a goal of the experimenting society (Campbell 1998). It is implicit in the presence of a 
monitoring and evaluation framework, which declares intent to experiment and learn, compared to the 
implementation of an innovative and creative policy solution with the intention of getting it right the first 
time (Peters 1998). So, learning may be produced, but how can we measure the extent of it? The learning 
literature presents two options. First, in line with Hall (1993), who grades policy learning from minor 
policy amendments to major policy shifts, we can seize the moment of learning as when policies are seen 
to have changed (see also Bennett and Howlett 1992). This perspective is utilised by Owens (2010) to 
explain how expert knowledge influenced policy formation in UK climate policy, and learning can thus be 
explained by the experiment producing change within the policy system. However, several caveats must be 
met to use this approach. First, Weiss (1977) notes how the effects of experiments on policy networks are 
likely to be indirect and protracted, so measuring them directly is difficult. Policy changes are really only 
detectable over a matter of years, Sabatier states a minimum of 10 years is appropriate, so only older 
experiments could be assessed. Also, the complexities of policy formation and reformation mean isolating 
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variables that explain change is a huge task, and a mammoth task for a comparative study of multiple 
experiments. Another way to assess subsequent policy learning from experiments is to measure the change 
in an individual playing a role in the network. More in line with Sabatier’s definition of learning as an 
enduring alteration of thought or behaviour (1988) we can focus on an individual’s recorded change in 
understanding, based on their experience of the experiment. It may not be as thorough an analysis as 
tracking the influence of the experiment’s evidence on long term policy changes, but it allows for young 
experiments to be assessed and in higher numbers.  
This is the path we take in this research; gauging the impact of an experiment on its policy network by 
assessing the change in perception of policy decision makers who may have been influenced by the 
experiment’s evidence.  One approach to measuring how effective experimental evidence is for policy is to 
engage Cash et al.’s 2002 science-policy boundary model. The credibility, salience, and legitimacy of a 
science-policy interface can be seen as important determinants of the effectiveness of its evidence (Sarkki 
et al. 2014). Credibility refers to the degree to which policy makers consider the findings of the experiment 
authoritative and believable, and to the degree in which they trust the outcomes. Salience refers to the 
relevance of the experiment findings at a certain moment in time. Legitimacy refers to the degree to which 
an information producing process was fair and whether it considered appropriate values, concerns, and 
perspectives of different actors (Cash et al. 2002). These indicators are chosen here because they are well 
established in the literature, and because they make good proxy learning indicators. It is expected that 
fulfilling these criteria better will lead to higher learning effects in the longer run.  
 
Analytical Framework 
An experiment is an avenue for connecting science (knowledge) to policy (action). In the literature, 
science-policy interfaces (‘SPI’) are defined as: “social processes which encompass relations between 
scientists and other actors in the policy process, and which allows for exchanges, co-evolution, and joint 
construction of knowledge with the aim of enriching decision-making and/or research” (Sarkki et al. 
2014). Experiments can be seen then as a temporary site where science and policy can ‘engage in elaborate 
and productive interplay’ (Munaretto and Huitema 2012). Drawing on policy sciences (e.g. Dryzek 1987; 
Owens et al. 2004; Sanderson 2009) and SPI (Pielke 2007) literature, we construct a model that reflects 
how experiment evidence is constructed and used, and draw assumptions about how experiments might be 
designed under this model. The ideal types encapsulate three perspectives of the role of science in policy 
making: the technocratic, boundary, and advocacy experiments; and the various configurations of 
institutional rules that underlie the ideal types form the foundation of our learning analysis in the following 
section. The rules stem from Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework (2005) and are 
those of an action situation that determine who is involved and who is excluded (boundary rules), how 
tasks and responsibilities are distributed (choice rules), what types of information are distributed, how 
regularly, and to whom (information rules), the extent of buy-in by participants (pay-off rules); and how 
decisions are made. 
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It is contended in this paper that the types vary in the extent to which they impact the perception of 
political decision makers relevant to an experiment. Based on the SPI literature we argue that an 
experiment’s rule configuration, and thus its ideal type, can be used to explain how credible, salient, and 
legitimate the policy network perceives the experiment’s evidence. The idea that a SPI’s design choices 
affect its evidence has support. Sarkki et al (2014) attempt to understand trade-offs made by SPIs and 
identify several management and design choices which they claim improve a SPI’s effectiveness, and 
several of the factors they claim influence the success of a SPI are summarised in table 1. How these 
design choices shape each ideal type is explained in the following section.  
 
Learning 
indicators 
Corresponding 
rule 
Design choice to improve learning 
Credibility Boundary rule Isolating experts, neutrality or bias in position 
 Boundary rule Limiting participation of non-state actors 
 Info rule Only utilising scientific knowledge 
 Info rule Distributing knowledge to everyone 
 Info rule Open and transparent distribution  
Salience Info rule Utilisation of place-based, non-scientific 
knowledge  
 Info rule Effective and timely distribution of information 
 Boundary rule Involving actors of like mind 
 Boundary rule Engaging decision makers 
Legitimacy Boundary rule Increased inclusiveness 
 Position rule Openness to new participants 
 Position rule Facilitation, conflict management 
 Authority rule Designating power to all participants 
 Info rule Open and transparent distribution  
 Aggregation rule Consensus based decision making 
 
Table 1: A summary of how the proxy learning indicators relate to the institutional rules. 
 
Technocratic ideal type 
The technocratic experiment resembles the technical-rational model of policy decision making, where an 
expert elite generates scientific knowledge for policy decisions (Owens et al. 2004; Fischer 2007). In this 
arrangement, the experiment produces scientific information with little or no connection to the policy 
process until the end, when the results are presented to decision makers. Scientists thus play a vital, but 
objective and disconnected, role in politics as ‘science arbiters’ (Pielke Jr. 2007). These expert actors are 
the initiators and sole participants of a technocratic experiment and maintain control over its design, 
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monitoring, and evaluation. Due to political disagreement, policy actors commission the experiment in 
order to produce factual evidence, so they fund the project and they develop an action theory and set the 
policy goals that the experiment needs to fit in in advance. However, they are disconnected from the 
project itself and have no decision authority. Scientific knowledge is the only type of information valued 
and generated by the experiment and fact finding occurs within the parameters of the goals previously set. 
This arrangement separates science from policy decision making and helps reinforce the view that science 
is impartial to politics, which upholds the scientific integrity of the evidence but may compromise its 
policy relevance.  
Based on our understanding of Cash’s typology, we argue that these design features influence the 
perception of the produced evidence in terms of its credibility, salience, and legitimacy. First, we would 
expect the experiment evidence to be considered highly credible due to the emphasis on independent 
scientific methods and expertise, as well as the open and transparent transmission of scientific information 
to participants. However, limiting participation to expert actors only and excluding discussion on different 
perspectives means the experiment is less likely to produce knowledge that resonates with the needs of 
policy makers, reducing the possibility of evidence being considered salient. The closed character of the 
experiment makes the legitimacy of the results questionable as the research question, data gathering 
process, and report writing has not involved stakeholder groups or ordinary citizens and might not address 
arguments they consider important.  
 
Boundary ideal type 
A boundary experiment is one in which policy actors open up the policy process to any actor, state or non-
state who has a desire to influence policy making. The role of the scientist resembles the ‘honest broker of 
policy alternatives’ (Pielke Jr. 2007), where they engage with the policy process and develop policy 
solutions in accordance with multiple value-perspectives. A boundary experiment is initiated by a 
collaboration of actors and the production of scientific knowledge is supplemented by multiple knowledge 
systems- relevant contextual, lay and traditional forms of knowledge, which are considered of equal value 
(Koetz et al 2012). This policy relevant knowledge is also subject to an extended societal peer review 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) as non-state actors have influence and decision power over the experiment’s 
design, monitoring, and evaluation. Discussion over goal setting is high in a boundary experiment and 
there is reflection on whether the experiment adheres to acceptable societal aims. Deliberative practices are 
encouraged with transparent information transmission, open dialogue, and regular communication among 
participants. Ideally, this engagement will allow different interpretations of the policy problem to emerge 
that build into a common consensus on the most appropriate course of action (Dryzek 1987). 
These design features are expected to produce quite different learning outcomes to the technocratic type. 
Such wide boundary settings ensure that non-state actors have access to policy making where they can 
influence how a public policy problem is solved. We would expect this to mean the experiment evidence 
would be perceived as very legitimate, as the inclusion of different perspectives increases the chance that 
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the evidence resonates with societal needs (Hegger et al 2012). Moreover, open and transparent 
information transmission between participants allows for the ‘extended peer review’ of experiment 
evidence by a range of actors, rendering the information produced more relevant to policy and more 
legitimate. The inclusion of different knowledge types will dilute the sense of independent and reliable 
knowledge being produced; thereby lowering the perception of credibility, but this design would open up 
debates about what knowledge is relevant to addressing pressing policy needs. 
 
Advocacy ideal type 
An advocacy experiment produces evidence that steers policy towards a pre-defined position (Pielke Jr. 
2007). It is organized by policy makers and populated by dominant, traditional actors (Hoogma et al. 
2002), which may make it a diverse group but they are all part of the same advocacy coalition. Although 
appearing neutral, the experiment supports particular outcomes as participants must be invited and 
outsiders are barred from gaining access (Owens et al. 2004). Involvement is restricted by certain 
conditions and those with contrasting expectations are excluded. A steering group of dominant participants 
control the design, monitoring and evaluation procedures, reinforcing existing structures of power. Within 
the group, only the dominant participants discuss and shape goals through the use of a facilitator so 
prevailing norms are protected, which also limits the generation of new ideas. Sensitive information is not 
shared so information distribution and openness tends to be low within the wider group as well as with 
outsiders. Advocacy experiments are producers of policy-based evidence, where despite it producing new 
knowledge about a policy idea, the experiment is designed so that it suppresses unintended or unflattering 
results and only promotes the promised benefits.  
The expected learning patterns are as follows: credibility is undermined by including policy and non-state 
actors in the experiment along with expert actors, as does the production of practical knowledge alongside 
scientific knowledge. Moreover, if it is noticed, the process of cherry-picking information affects the 
reliability of the results. In the attempt to show there is support for a particular proposal, the initiator 
blocks participation by critical actors and thereby undermines their concerns, reducing fairness and the 
perceived legitimacy of the project. However, the salience of the findings may be perceived of as high 
when the experiment acts as a means for keeping an idea alive (Greenberg et al. 2003), and outcomes are 
presented when the time is right- carefully gauged and engineered by the policy actors involved.  
In summary, the three types are expected to produce different levels of learning effects. Appendix A 
clearly illustrates the distinctions between the types and their rule settings. Table 2 summarises the 
expectations sketched above into three tentative hypotheses: 
 Credibility Salience Legitimacy 
H1:technocratic type Highest Lowest Middle 
H2: boundary type Middle Middle Highest 
H3: advocacy type Lowest Highest  Lowest 
Table 2: Summary of hypotheses that link ideal types to specific learning indicators.    
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It has been suggested that it is difficult to maximize all three criteria (Cash et al. 2002), and attempts to 
improve one criterion might actually lead to lower scores for the other criteria. For example, by engaging 
policy makers you may improve salience because of the increased probability that the right questions are 
being asked. However, credibility is lowered if science is seen to be biased by the policy process. 
Likewise, limiting access from outside may increase credibility but decrease legitimacy. These tensions are 
attractive for the current research as the various types of experiments may be designed to score well on 
different criteria and thus lead to learning effects amongst decision makers in diverging ways. 
METHODS 
Case selection 
In order to utilise the framework, we need a set of policy experiments. Based on the policy science and 
adaptive management literatures, we identified six criteria for isolating experiment cases from a broader 
set of 147 innovative pilot cases related to adaptation: whether the project was testing for effects; whether 
it was innovative with uncertain outcomes; whether it had policy relevance; whether there was state 
involvement; whether it was eliciting an ecosystem response, and whether it was relevant to climate 
adaptation. These six are summarised in table 3) and elaborated on in turn in Appendix B. 18 cases were 
selected as meeting all six criteria, the most uncommon criteria being monitoring and evaluation 
framework and climate adaptation relevance. The cases have different spatial and temporal scales and deal 
with different problems; however, they are comparable due to their meeting the stringent conditions. 
Criteria Indicators 
Testing for effects Monitoring and evaluation framework in place 
Innovative Long-term alteration in policy or management practice 
Policy relevance Testing manifestation of new policy concept or approach 
State involvement Either as initiator or a minor party 
Ecosystem response Intervention straddled the social-ecological system 
Climate adaptation Any bearing on adaptation planning at all 
Table 3: Sets out the six criteria and associated indicators used to identify policy experiments in Dutch 
climate adaptation. 
 
Experiment cases 
Climate adaptation is increasingly understood as a matter of urgency in a lowland country such as the 
Netherlands, as it is particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise, flooding, salt-water intrusion, fresh water 
availability, and increased drought. The 18 experiment cases in Dutch climate adaptation tested policy 
innovations in coastal defence, water availability, multi-functional land use, water variability, and dike 
management. The names of the experiments are not given to honour confidentiality. They date between 
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1997- 2012 and almost half are ongoing. Ongoing cases were included in the analysis if they have passed 
at least one substantial evaluation phase.  
Based on previous survey data and a document analysis, each case was assessed and assigned an ideal 
type. In order to do this, they were judged on a set of indicators based on the institutional rules. Each 
indicator has a setting for the three ideal types. The indicators and specific rule settings are contained in 
Appendix A. In order to determine what type an experiment fell into, the cases were assessed against each 
indicator and were labelled the ideal type that was most common. For example, out of 14 indicators, 
experiment 2 had one score for a technocratic setting, 9 scores for boundary, and 4 scores for an advocacy 
setting; thus it was classified as a boundary experiment. The assessment concludes that for the 18 cases, 
five experiments met the technocratic definition, six were boundary experiments, and seven were advocacy 
experiments. It was uncommon for cases to fall absolutely into one type, for the ideal types are just 
theoretical constructions on which to base reality. However, out of 14 indicators one ideal type typically 
emerged as the dominant type, and each case was duly assigned. For this research the case number fell to 
17 because one experiment was omitted due to it being a national experiment and therefore relevant to all 
institutions throughout the country. 
Data collection- learning 
In order to measure the influence of each experiment on its surrounding policy network, we conducted a 
desktop search to identify decision makers at each relevant institutional level: being the municipality, the 
water board, the province, and the ministerial level (where appropriate). Using random sampling we 
produced a list of 40 respondents for each experiment, and each respondent was emailed the survey link. If 
a case did not generate responses, other respondents were identified on the list. To encourage participation 
and prove the legitimacy of the survey, we included in the email an endorsement from the President of the 
Dutch Union of Water boards, Mr. Peter Glas. The initial email was followed by two reminders.  
 
Survey design 
The 40 respondents were first asked whether they had heard of the experiment conducted in their area. If 
they responded yes, the respondents were asked a series of closed questions and statements to gauge their 
perception on how credible, salient, and legitimate they thought the experiment was. If they did not know 
of the experiment they were directed to the end of the survey. Other questions included: how relevant they 
thought the responses were to their policy decisions, how innovative they thought the project was, what the 
rate of policy change experienced by their organisation was, and for what reason they thought the 
experiment was organised.  
 
Data Analysis 
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The survey results were analysed using statistical data-analysis software (SPSS 21). Basic descriptive 
statistics (frequency tables, cross-tabulations), Kruskal-Wallis tests to gauge differences in distribution and 
ANOVA (analysis of variance) tests were used to assess the statistical significance of variation.  
 
RESULTS 
This section describes the results of the survey, the characteristics and significance of the cases, and the 
extent of policy learning from each case. 
From the sampling a total of 164 responses were received, of which 60% had heard of the experiment 
relevant to their area. Completed surveys were rarer (N=79). Appendix C sets out, for each case, the 
number of initial responses received, how many of those respondents had knowledge of the experiment in 
question, and how many went on to complete a survey in full. Appendix C also notes for each case which 
institutions responded: municipality (responded in 10 cases); water authority (16); province (10); ministry 
(2). The survey was also sent to decision makers at the enforcement arm of the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Environment, Rijkswaterstaat (Department for Waterways and Public Works) if this institution was 
involved in a case. As shown in table 4, the water authorities were most heavily represented, possibly 
because of the endorsement by their head, as well as the issues being most relevant to their organisations 
(see Appendix B).  
 
Institution # 
responses 
Percent knew 
case 
Percent completed 
survey 
Municipality 37 (23%) 57 36 
Water Authority 68 (42%) 73 66 
Province 54 (34%) 43 38 
Ministry 2 (1%) 100 50 
TOTAL 161
1
 62% 47.5% 
Table 4: Extent of responses from individual institutions 
 
Experiments 
Characteristics of the experiments 
Experiments differed according to what climate issue they tackled and the main reasons they were 
implemented. The experiments dealt with a range of climate issues, from safety against sea level rise, 
increased precipitation, water variability, drought, and salinity, and these differed somewhat between ideal 
                                                          
1 Three respondents did not give their institutional affiliation. 
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types (graph 1). Safety and precipitation- usually testing multi-functional land use approaches- were most 
common. Although the cases varied in issue, what they did have in common was their affiliation with 
water. This is explained by the overlaying of climate adaptation measures predominantly atop of the 
established water management issues, thereby allowing the Dutch government to claim they are 
responding to climate adaptation without changing their incumbent institutional structure. This is 
understandable since the Dutch are particularly vulnerable to water related climate events such as sea level 
rise, salt water intrusion, increased precipitation and drought (Biesbroek et al. 2011) and other adaptation 
related responses- such as land-use planning and agriculture- are coupled to water concerns (e.g. multi-
functional land use, self-sufficient farming). 
 
 
Graph 1: Number of experiments for each climate issue, divided by ideal types 
 
The main reason for organising an experiment was seen to be measuring a new approach for unknown 
effects, followed by the opportunity to strengthen ties among actors (graph 2). The main reason for each 
type is to test for unknown effects; although the graph shows that advocacy experiments are most seen to 
strengthen ties, and boundary types are seen to be controversial and needing to be tested on a small scale. 
 
Graph 2: Perceived reasons for conducting experiments grouped according to ideal type. 
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Significance of experiments 
To assess the significance of the cases, we asked decision makers what they thought the impact of 
experiment findings would be on their policy choices. Graph 3 shows that boundary experiments are 
considered to have the most impact on policy ideas, and in general experiments are expected to have 
impact on current and future policy. Of those who had an opinion, very few decision makers believed that 
experiment evidence would have no impact on policy decisions. We also asked decision makers how 
innovative they thought the experiments were, with only 10% stating they thought their case was not very 
or not at all innovative (graph 4). Boundary types are even significantly perceived as more innovative than 
the other two (Kruskal-Wallis test for distribution across ideal types: p<0.05 = 0.046). 
 
Graph 3: How the decision makers’ opinion on experiment impact differs according to ideal type. 
 
 
Graph 4: How the ideal types differ according to how innovative they are seen to be. 
 
Policy learning 
The following section presents the survey data results for each aspect of policy learning we measured. A 
minimum of four full responses was the cut-off and due to the lack of responses from cases 7, 8 and 9 they 
were removed from the analysis. We will revisit these cases in the discussion, as it is of interest that 
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learning assessment we use a total of 14 cases- five technocratic, four boundary, and five advocacy 
experiments. 
Credibility 
In order to assess how decision makers perceive the scientific adequacy of the technical evidence and 
arguments produced by each experiment, we asked them a series of seven questions. The questions gauge a 
decision maker’s perception of data quality, their trust in the experts, and the standard of the conclusions, 
which are all composite factors that can be put together and used to measure credibility as a variable. The 
questions were answered on a scale ranging from: (1) no certainly not; (2) not really; (3) neutral; (4) 
somewhat; (5) certainly. Reliability of each composite measure was determined by computing Cronbach’s 
alpha (α). The factors had a high reliability score (α= 0.92), well over the 0.7 needed to justify the 
aggregation into one variable (De Vaus 2002). The entire sample averaged 4.1 with a range from 2-5, 
which means on average decision makers considered the evidence produced by the experiments as 
somewhat credible (table 5). The response means differ slightly among different institutional levels, with 
municipal decision makers scoring the experiments slightly lower than the others, but there is no 
significant difference in the scores between parties. 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Significance between cases 
Credibility score 70 2 5 4.1 0.64 Yes (p<0.05= 0.02) 
Table 5: Summary of respondent’s scores for the variable credibility. 
When the average credibility scores are divided up among the ideal types we see that contrary to our 
hypothesis, the technocratic experiment actually scores lowest out of the three types. Further, an ANOVA 
test reveals that the average of the scores across the three types (table 6) differ significantly across types 
(p<0.05 = 0.033) with the scores from the boundary experiments being significantly higher than those 
measured in the technocratic experiments (p<0.05 = 0.026). Graph 5 shows the distribution of scores for 
each of the types over the seven measured indicators. Running a kruskal-wallis test shows that for the 
indicators “trustworthy experts” and “clear questions” the results are significantly different for each ideal 
type, so these indicators are where the technocratic types are the weakest. 
Ideal Type N Mean 
Technocratic 24 3.9 
Boundary 17 4.5 
Advocacy 29 4.1 
Table 6: Comparing ideal types mean scores for credibility 
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Graph 5: how the ideal types differ for each question measuring credibility. 
 
Salience 
In order to assess how decision makers perceive the relevance of the evidence to the needs of policy 
decision makers, we asked them to respond to a series of nine statements. The statements gauge a decision 
maker’s perception of whether the findings filled a knowledge gap for policy makers, whether the 
experiment was a matter of public interest, whether the results were adequately communicated to policy 
actors, and whether the evidence created an opportunity to renew policy. These composite factors can also 
be put together and used to measure salience as a variable. The questions were answered on a scale ranging 
from: (1) strongly disagree; (2) disagree; (3) neutral; (4) agree; (5) strongly agree. Reliability of each 
composite measure was determined by computing Cronbach’s alpha (α). The factors had a good reliability 
score (α= 0.84), again over the 0.7 needed to justify the aggregation into one variable. 
The results show that on average, survey participants responded favourably to the statements (mean= 3.6) 
meaning the decision makers on the whole found experimental evidence relevant to policy making (table 
7). The different institutions grade the experiments lower for salience than for credibility, although this 
time municipalities are slightly more favourable than the others. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Significance between cases 
Salience score 72 2.22 5 3.6 0.6 Yes (p<0.05= 0.005) 
Table 7: Summary of scores for the variable salience 
When comparing the scores for each ideal type (table 8), we see our hypotheses are partially met, in that 
the technocratic type is significantly less salient (p=0.002). However, contrary to expectations the 
boundary type experiments scored exactly the same as the advocacy experiments. By reviewing graph 6 we 
can see how each type scores on the individual questions, with the boundary type scoring higher on 
statements about “how well the results were communicated”, whether “the experiment was within the 
public interest” (p=0.045), and “how well the results converted directly to policy” (p=0.022). In contrast, 
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clear questions*
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advocacy experiments scored best on statements regarding “answers relevant questions” (p=0.017) and 
“provides chances to renew policy”. The statements with a p-value are those that were found to be 
significant after conducting a kruskal-wallis test, illustrating again where the technocratic experiments are 
weakest. Technocratic experiments are perceived of as not salient in three indicators that dip below the 
middle score of three, confirming the assumption that separating science and policy reduces 
communication, question relevance, and renders the results of little use of policy makers. 
Ideal Type N Mean 
Technocratic 24 3.3 
Boundary 19 3.8 
Advocacy 29 3.8 
Total 72  
Table 8: Comparing ideal types mean scores for salience 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6: how the ideal types differ for each statement measuring salience. 
 
Legitimacy 
The last variable to assess is legitimacy. In order to assess how decision makers perceive how fair and 
balanced the experiment process was, we asked them to respond to five questions. The questions gauge a 
decision maker’s opinion on whether the experiment included all relevant parties from the area, whether 
perspectives were treated respectfully, how transparent the process was, and whether the goals of the 
experiment were in line with community values. These composite factors were put together and used to 
measure legitimacy as a variable. The questions were answered on a scale ranging from: (1) no certainly 
not; (2) not really; (3) neutral; (4) somewhat; (5) certainly. The factors had a high Cronbach’s alpha score 
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(α= 0.88), over the 0.7 needed to justify the aggregation into one variable (De Vaus 2002). The results 
show that on average, survey participants responded favourably to the statements (mean= 3.8) meaning the 
decision makers found the process of experimentation legitimate (table 9). The institution scores vary 
slightly, with the provinces this time scoring experiments the highest for their legitimacy, but the scores do 
not vary significantly. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Significance between cases 
Legitimacy 
score 
69 1 5 3.8 0.76 Yes (p<0.05= 0.009) 
Table 9: Summary of scores for the variable legitimacy. 
When it comes to evaluating the differences in ideal types, again the boundary experiments come out on 
top. Table 10 shows that there is a marked difference in the averages, with boundary experiments 
significantly more legitimate than technocratic (p=0.002) and advocacy (p=0.046) experiments. When we 
assess the questions more closely (graph 7), we see that despite their lower scores technocratic and 
advocacy experiments still score above neutral in all areas, but are still far behind the boundary experiment 
in nearly all indicators. 
 
Ideal Type N Mean 
Technocratic 24 3.5 
Boundary 17 4.3 
Advocacy 28 3.8 
Total 69  
Table 10: Comparing ideal types mean scores for legitimacy 
 
 
Graph 7: how the ideal types differ for each statement measuring legitimacy. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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What can the results tell us about how the design of an experiment affects a decision maker’s perception of 
the evidence? First, design seems to matter, and the significance of scores between ideal types indicates 
that we are on to something by explaining learning with this model. However, the assumptions we drew 
from the literature about how design impacts learning were not mirrored by the empirical findings. 
Technocratic experiments scored well on most indicators, but still consistently lower than the other two 
types. Salience was expectedly low, but a technocratic experiment being least credible was a surprise. To 
decision makers at least, isolating experts from policy and limiting participation makes an experiment less 
credible, not more. It mattered less that these experiments had more open and transparent information 
channels than the advocacy experiments. The results also highlight a contradiction in the literature. At its 
inception, credible evidence was defined as the perceived scientific adequacy of a SPI’s technical evidence 
and arguments (Cash et al. 2003). Generalizable, scientific knowledge was considered most plausible and 
accurate. However, in the theoretical development of these indicators, credibility has essentially been 
broadened to include place-based knowledge in science (e.g. Hegger et al. 2012). For experiments at least, 
when a broad set of actors are seen to contribute contextual, practical knowledge, this place-based 
knowledge counts for more than scientifically defensible knowledge even with a lack of transparency and 
information distribution between the participants. Although it must be noted that when transparency and 
distribution are high, the perception of credibility is sky-high- as shown by the success of boundary 
experiments. 
 
Our results for salience were also partly surprising, as boundary experiments managed the same moderate 
score as advocacy experiments. There is some doubt whether boundary experiments can always produce 
salient knowledge, especially if decision makers are responding to cues other than societal norms (e.g. 
international, economic, political influences) but in these instances they were seen produce relevant results. 
The salience of the sample was lower than the other indicators of learning, perhaps indicating the difficulty 
for experiments to maintain their connection to policy. Finally, from reading the scores for legitimacy it is 
plainly clear how increased inclusiveness and openness improves this attribute. Boundary experiments 
were perceived of as significantly more legitimate than the other two types on nearly all the legitimacy 
indicators. If policy makers want to be seen as meeting societal goals and creating fair policy processes, 
then they need to pay attention to their experimental design. 
 
When considering the impact of the results on theory we turn to the SPI literature. Cash et al (2002) state 
that although the salience, credibility and legitimacy attributes are not isolated from one another in a SPI, 
trying to increase the  likelihood of one actually causes tensions, in that bolstering one attribute will often 
decrease the extent of another. We will apply our findings to two main tensions (ibid.). Tension one is the 
design choice of whether to engage policy actors/decision makers in the experiment, thereby isolating 
science from the policy process. We would expect that including policy actors means the questions would 
be policy relevant and increase salience, but it would decrease credibility due to science being seen to be 
biased by political concerns. As discussed above, experiments with a broad set of actors had more 
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credibility than those without policy actors/minimal policy participation. Experiments furthest away from 
policy generated the least trust in their experts and questions were considered the least clear, maybe 
explained by a fear of ‘science biasing policy’. The second tension is that including a broad range of actors 
increase relevance because the problem perception is better understood, but legitimacy is affected because 
some actors are involved that others think should not be. We did not see evidence of this in our cases. In 
fact, legitimacy was highest when there was the most actor diversity and shared authority. Our results 
challenge the assumption that trade-offs need to be made when designing a SPI.  
 
The results of the survey reveal that on the whole policy experiments make a positive impression on their 
surrounding policy network. On average they are seen to be of high quality, and produce results that are 
very credible, moderately salient, and moderately legitimate, with no significant difference between scores 
from different institutions. The results bode well for actors looking to use the method to assess future 
innovations. However, that decision makers find the process of experimentation a largely positive 
endeavour is a useful finding, and begs the questions: why is the process not used more to develop and 
evaluate policy and management strategies in climate adaptation? Moreover, why had so many 
respondents (almost half) never heard of the projects? The first question is one for future research, but we 
note from our case studies that the cost and the uncertainty of risk make it hard for policy makers to 
swallow the idea that failure does not matter. Supporting this assumption is the number of cases that 
stressed the importance of building political and public support for the project before it even hits the 
drawing board, which is a factor we did not capture in our framework, and being explicit in the fact that if 
the experiment fails, the costs will be borne by the state. On reflection, it makes sense that policy actors are 
cautious about innovating and taking risks, since they are spending public money (Duijn 2009), although 
the costs of not adapting may far outweigh the costs of trying new ways to keep society’s proverbial head 
above water. 
In regards to the second question, respondents were randomly chosen but the ones with environmental 
portfolios were targeted first, so we can assume that experiments are being conducted in jurisdictions 
where relevant political decision makers are unaware of their presence. Two experiments had to be 
withdrawn from the learning analysis due to a lack of data despite a high response rate and one removed 
because there was almost no response at all. This- and the response rate in general, unfortunately reduced 
our case size and limited our findings. Why were decision makers not aware of three of the projects? They 
were different types, and two were completed, so these variables do not explain it. An election might 
replace decision makers, but other, older experiments were adequately responded to in the survey. 
Visibility and success might be relevant factors, and we failed to control for these variables. Another 
explanation might be that the respondents are just not interested in these sorts of projects. Pawson (2006) 
suggests that as one moves further up the bureaucratic chain, their appetite for evidence dwindles, so we 
could interpret the survey results as indicating which experiments are most visible to the political elite. 
How initiators of these experiments managed to catch the policy network’s attention is also a question for 
future research. 
20 | P a g e  
 
That the design of an experiment has a strong effect on how it is perceived is a proposition derived from 
the literature. Other reasons could be given for the variation in learning we measured. For example, 
intervening variables include the extent the experiment was seen as innovative or its impact on policy. As 
we saw in the results, boundary experiments also scored highest on these factors. This suggests that policy 
actors are utilising this design for particular types of projects. The extent of constraints on design choices 
is another focus for future research. 
In conclusion, when a policy experiment is understood as an appraisal of a policy innovation, it makes a lot 
of sense to analyse it as a temporary science-policy interface that produces evidence for policy action. 
Applying an institutional lens allows us to thoroughly test our assumptions that design matters when 
looking to produce learning. These assumptions are strong due to their theoretical origins, drawn from 
policy sciences and science and technology studies. Our research sheds light on the perception of 
adaptation experiments in the Dutch policy network, with interesting findings that can be used to assist 
policy makers in designing future experiments. However, just because the perceptions of experiment cases 
were generally positive in the policy network does not mean the experiments themselves were or will be 
adopted. Actual policy influence takes time to identify and measure, and the literature is not too positive on 
whether experiments really meet these expectations. Greenberg et al. (2003) discovered no instances where 
effects of their evaluated cases were decisive in the decision to adopt the tested policy, rather political 
reasons ended up trumping experiment evidence. Vreugdenhil et al. (2010) conclude also that pilot projects 
often have limited influence over their policy domains. So, boundary experiments guarantee the adoption 
of a particular policy strategy is not a finding we can claim. However, the results take us one step on the 
path towards understanding the kind of role experiments play in policy making. 
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APPENDIX A 
Rules Indicator technocratic  boundary advocacy 
Boundary Actor Inclusiveness All / predominantly 
all expert actors 
All actor types 
involved 
All / predominantly 
all policy actors 
 Accessibility to 
experiment 
Invited by initiator Requested 
involvement 
Have organiser 
role/obliged 
 Group members 
already met 
Some   No Yes 
 Openness to new 
participants 
Marginally/ some 
allowed 
Open Marginally/ closed 
Position Stakeholder role No stakeholders Interested parties as 
stakeholders 
Few stakeholders 
 Initiator role Expert actors Collaboration of 
actors 
Policy actors 
 Use of facilitator Not used Used Used for select 
parties 
Information Contribution to goals No one All actors Actors who are in 
agreement 
 Lay knowledge 
contributed 
None Yes, to a large 
degree 
Some, but not solely 
 Scientific knowledge 
contributed 
Majority Some Marginally 
 Amount information 
received 
Sufficient amount 
for majority of 
participants 
Sufficient amount 
for all participants 
Sufficient amount for 
minority of 
participants 
 Opportunity for 
personal contact 
between participants 
Limited Regular Regular for only 
some participants 
Choice Authority at decision 
nodes 
Expert initiators Shared power Policy initiators 
Pay-off How costs distributed Minimal buy-in Buy-in No buy-in 
Aggregation How decisions made Experts by majority 
in line with 
scientific methods 
Everyone by 
consensus on basis 
of deliberation 
Policy actor by 
majority in reference 
to shared principles 
Table **: The difference in rule settings for each ideal type as delineated by the institutional rules. 
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APPENDIX B 
The changing practices of water boards 
The Dutch government see climate adaptation as a response to the water issues they face and there is an 
urgent political need to innovate with policy solutions to meet these concerns. Change is apparent; for 
instance with the issues of fresh water availability and drought. Traditionally the approach to water 
management was to drain the country of excess water. The use of land for farming required water levels to 
be as low as possible so vast, efficient drainage systems were built. With the threat of climate change and 
the development of knowledge about the link between surface and ground water (Kuks 2002), the focus 
has shifted into trying to store and maintain water on the land for longer periods. These changes require 
governance as well as technological responses, and experiments are carried out to test these ideas. Other 
examples of innovative changes in Dutch water management include the fashioning of policy concepts 
such as multi-functional land use, which combines flood reduction and nature management; dynamic 
coastal management and building with nature, which uses natural processes to reduce flood risk; and water 
husbandry, which encourages farmers to close the water cycle and be self-sufficient with the water they 
have.  
 
It is within the ambit of these responses that policy experiments were identified; however, it was not an 
easy task to designate a project either an experiment or some other type of project; e.g. a pilot project. The 
term is used quite freely in the academic literature, which is in part why this research has been undertaken, 
to try and understand what we really mean when we talk about experiments. The answer is we mean 
something specific, and actually rather rare. From an adaptive management perspective, Gunderson cites 
three reasons why experiments are uncommon: the natural system is not resilient to systematic testing; the 
social system (i.e. the political system) is inflexible; and there are significant technical challenges to 
designing experiments (Gunderson 1999). From the experience of hunting for them, it would appear the 
inflexibility (or unwillingness to fail, spend the money, and spend the time) to experiment properly would 
be the most common reason. Nevertheless, a sample was obtained and analysed.  
 
Drawing from the literature, a policy experiment is expected to test causal claims, to the extent that it is 
able and that proponents perceive this as possible (a substantial body of literature has developed around the 
arguments for and against experimental evaluation to assess claims). Essentially, this test for causality is 
what separates experiments from other types of pilot projects, and why they are considered a superior form 
of evidence. However, experimenting to establish causal effects of policy changes is more straightforward 
in social and economic policy than environmental policy. When assessing the social system the treatments 
are applied to randomly chosen human actors and this can be done relatively easily, compared to the 
thicket of variables that need to be controlled for if randomness and control groups are attempted in the 
social-ecological system. Policy experiments are different from other projects by their status as pilots; 
however, pilot projects and policy experiments are not the same thing.  The differentiation arguably lies in 
the extent of monitoring and evaluation. Calling a project a pilot infers that it is temporary, or first, but 
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most pilots are not monitored for effects, or even evaluated. A significant proportion is used for 
demonstration rather than testing (Sanderson 2002). It is argued here that there is room for a definition of 
experiment between a strict experimental design and a demonstration, which would be indicated by the 
presence of a monitoring and evaluation framework. The evaluation may only be of the ecosystem 
response, but thorough experiments will assess the social acceptance, or buy-in, of the social system as 
well. 
Second, an experiment tests a policy innovation, in the sense of a long term alteration in policy or 
management practice as opposed to a mere adjustment of current practices (Duijn 2009). Policy 
innovations emerge from a significant concern- e.g. climate change, economic crisis- where incumbent 
solutions are not enough and policy makers are willing to imagine innovations that are then tested by 
experiment.  
Third, a policy relevant innovation relates to a new policy concept or approach, indicated by a significant 
departure from the norm. This can come in the form of a new policy concept; such as building with nature 
or multi-functional land use, whereby experiments are original manifestations of the new concept in 
practice; or a new approach, like the shift from the state being responsible for water management to users, 
or the practice of storing water within the system instead of draining it. 
The final three criteria were whether there was state involvement (specifically water boards), whether the 
experiment straddled the social ecological system by eliciting an ecosystem response, and whether it was 
relevant to climate adaptation. State involvement is important to declare an experiment policy relevant, and 
water boards were chosen because of their specific focus on water management, intention to innovate due 
to recently divested responsibilities, long-term focus on water management, and the fact they were 
involved in nearly every project assessed. Cases were looked for by searching for phrases such as: test 
pilots, innovation, experiment, “proef, onderzoek, pilot, on programme websites, ministry, province and 
water board websites, and mentioned in scoping interviews. Projects that were deemed irrelevant included 
product testing, concept pilots, modelling projects, and reapplications of the initial experiment.  
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APPENDIX C 
The table notes survey responses for each experiment (Mun. = municipality; W.A. = water authority; Prov. 
= province; Min. = Ministry for Environment). Please note there are no experiments 12, 13, 16, and 20. 
 
Exp # # Init. resp. #Know case # Comp. resp. Mun. W.A. Prov. Min. 
1 9 5 4 x x x  
2 9 9 6  x x  
3 10 4 4  x   
4 8 6 6 x x   
5 11 9 9 x x x  
6 9 5 4  x x  
7 11 4 1  x   
8 4 1 1   x  
9 11 2 2 x x   
10 11 8 4 x x  x 
11 7 7 7 x x x x 
14 12 8 5 x x x  
15 10 5 5  x   
17 7 6 5 x x x  
18 9 8 6 x x   
19 10 6 6 x x x  
21 16 4 4  x x  
Total 
(ave) 
164 97 (60%) 79 (48%) 10 16 10 2 
 
